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1.   INTRODUCTION 
Śaṅkara’s (788-820 CE) philosophy is known as Kevalādvaita system of philosophy.  Baruch Spinoza (1632 –1677 CE) 
was Jewish-Dutch philosopher who propounded Absolute Monism. Eastern and Western civilizations are different but 
they have tackled the same philosophical problems and in solving them, their method and assumptions were strikingly 
similar. Same is the case with Śaṅkara and Spinoza as they come under one roof of Absolute Monism.  Though there are 
some differences peculiar to their philosophies, some similarities should be noticed when we think about universal 
spirituality and global harmony. 
2.   ABSOLUTE MONISM 
2.1 Kevalādvaita of Śaṅkara: 
Śaṅkara’s philosophy can be given in nutshell as – ‘Brahma satyam jagat mithyā’. Brahman is the sole reality for him. 
Diverse things exist on vyāvahārika level but their validity is negated on pāramārthika level. Diversity is regarded as the 
creation of māyā or ignorance. Reality of many things is overruled on the basis of vivartavāda1 and only one thing is 
accepted to be real i.e. Brahman. Therefore, his philosophy is known as Kevalādvaita. 
2.2. Spinoza’s Substance Monism: 
Spinoza has clearly defined Substance as –‘that which is in itself and conceived through itself; in other words, that, the 
conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed.’1  
Therefore, substance can be only one.
2
 If there were two substances, they would limit each other and cease to be 
independent, i.e. they would cease to be substances. Hence there can be only one substance, which depends on nothing, 
and on which everything depends. He clearly says that –except God, no substance can be conceived.3 If there were any 
substance except God, it would have to be explained through some attribute of God, and so two substances of the same 
attribute would exist, which is absurd. According to Spinoza, God only correctly fits into the definition of substance.  
                                                         
1
 Vivartavāda is to consider cause doesn’t undergo any changes even after effect is produced. Atattvataḥ anyathābhāva is 
vivarta as explained in Vedāntasāra. Experiencing snake in the place of rope is not real transformation (Pariṇāma) but 
Vivarta. 
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3.   ULTIMATE REALITY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ŚAṄKARA AND SPINOZA 
Brahman is the ultimate reality in Śaṅkara’s system of philosophy. Nature of Brahman is explained by Śaṅkara in 
Brahmasūtraśaṅkarabhāṣya (B.S.S.) as athāto brahmajijñāsā.4  Brahman by nature is eternal, pure, intelligent, omniscient 
and omnipotent. The word Brahman is derived from the root Bṛṁh which denotes all these meanings.5 Spinoza’s 
Substance i.e. God coincides with Śaṅkara’s Absolute Brahman. Some common threads can be discussed as below: 
3.1. Indeterminate Reality:  
Highest reality for Śaṅkara is indeterminate i.e. nirguṇa. Brahman is beyond the qualities, words and form. It is described 
as neither subtle nor gross, neither short nor long, without birth or change, without form, attributes, colour and name.
6
 
Śruti statements like ‘Satyam jñānam anantam Brahma’ are accepted to denote the svarupa lakṣaṇa (the very nature) of 
Brahman. Śaṅkara’s viewpoint is explained by Rāmānuja in mahāpūrvapakṣa of Śrībhāṣya I.i.1. The word satya means 
satyetaravyāvṛti i.e. non-existent things are excluded from the definition of Brahman due to the use of the word satya. 
The word jñāna excludes things which are dependent on others for the illumination.  The word ‘ananta’ excludes those 
things which are limited by space, time and material.
7
 Śaṅkara while commenting upon Taitirīya Upaniṣad II.1.i states 
that words used to define Brahman actually function to differentiate Brahman from other entities that posses opposite 
qualities.
8
 Brahman is also defined as saccidānandam.9 Here also existence, consciousness and bliss are not the qualities 
of Brahman but essence of the same. 
God is having infinite attributes according to Spinoza but these attributes are equal to the essence of God
10
  which is 
exactly similar to that of Śaṅkara’s conception of Indeterminate Brahman.  
3.2. Non-interference:  
Interference of God in the fate of people is not admitted by Śaṅkara. He has proved this in the commentary over the 
aphorism- ‘vaiṣamyanairghṛṇye na sāpekşatvāt tathāhi darśayati’ (B.S.S. II.i.34). Everybody is influenced by his own 
desires, passions and previous karmans. Spinoza has also stated the same thing –‘God acts from the laws of his nature 
alone, and is compelled by no one.’11 It means- there is no cause either extrinsic or intrinsic, which prompts God to action, 
except the perfection of his nature. 
3.3. Omnipotence:  
God’s omnipotence has been ‘actual’ from eternity and will remain in the same actuality and eternity12 this is the 
proposition of Spinoza. In the aphorism, lokavattu līlā kaivalyam | (B.S.S. II.i.33) Śaṅkara comments that though creation 
of the universe looks like a gigantic task, it is like a sport for God because God is possessed with unlimited power.
13
 Thus, 
Śaṅkara has proved the omnipotence of Brahman. 
3.4. Indivisibility:  
Ultimate reality is indivisible. It means- it is without parts or without limbs. Partlessness of Brahman is proved in the 
aphorism-kṛtsnaprasaktirniravayatvaśabdakopo vā | (B.S.S. II.i.26) on the basis of scriptural authority.14 If Brahman is 
considered as having parts then it will be non-eternal.
15
 All the differences which are seen in the Brahman are imagined 
by ignorance
16
 and are not real. Moon though perceived as many by a man having blurred vision doesn’t become really 
so, similarly Brahman becomes subject to all kinds of transformations on account of ignorance. Since the differences like 
name and form originate from speech and thus partlessness of Brahman is not violated.
17
 Brahman is beyond all kinds of 
transformations. It is clearly stated by Śaṅkara that scriptural statements are not talking about real transformation. They 
establish that all this is in essence one with Brahman that is beyond all phenomenal process.
18
 Here the pantheistic 
outlook of Śaṅkara is seen as he has clearly propounded the unity between Brahman and the world having many 
differences. 
3.5. Eternality and infinity:  
Spinoza’s God is eternal; all God’s attributes are eternal.19  Substance is infinite.20 If it were finite, it would be limited by 
other substances, and consequently depend on them. Spinoza defines God as -‘Being absolutely and substance consisting 
of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.’21 Brahman is also called as nitya (eternal) 
and ananta (infinite) because It’s partelessness automatically gets concluded in its infinity. 
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3.6. Immutability:  
God’s immutability is proved in the proposition by Spinoza as ‘God’s existence and his essence are one and the same.’22  
God or all God’s attributes are immutable. If they changed as to their existence, they would also change to their essence, 
which is absurd. Immutability of the Brahman is stated by saying that Brahman is described as kūṭastha nitya.  
3.7. Perfection:  
Spinoza’s God is without passions and is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness.23  God loves himself with an 
infinite intellectual love i.e. the nature of God enjoys infinite perfection.
24
 This concept coincides with āptakamatva and 
nispṛhatva of Brahman. 
3.8. Self-caused Reality:  
In the sūtra, janmādyasya yataḥ | (B.S.S. I.i.2) Śaṅkara has proved that Brahman is the cause of the diverse universe. 
Again in Śāstrayonitvāt | (B.S.S. I.i.3), it is pointed out that even the scriptures have originated from Brahman.25 
In Upasaṁhāradarśanānneti cenna ksīravaddhi | (B.S.S. II.i.24), Śaṅkara has cited illustrations of milk and water. Just as 
milk or water gets transformed into curd or ice without any external cause similarly Brahman without any external cause 
creates the world.
26
 Brahman is not the parīṇāmī upādāna but vivarta upādāna of the world which gets proved in the 
aphorism - ātmani caiva vicitrāśca hi (B.S.S. II.i.28). Just as magician creates the elephant, horse etc similarly Brahman 
creates diverse world which is illusory. Here he has resorted to vivartavāda. Creation is the same thing like a magic 
shown by magician.
27
 Creation is mere illusion, it doesn’t exist in reality. It is the Ajātivāda propounded by Gauḍapāda 
wherein it is stated that nothing is born in reality.
28
 
From the Spinoza’s definition of Substance, it is followed that Substance is its own cause; it pertains to the nature of 
substance to exist.
29
 It doesn’t depend on any other thing. This definition is clear enough to prove that Substance exists 
without any cause and is without beginning. This is nothing but the acceptance of the theory of non-origination i.e. 
ajātivāada propounded by Gaudapada and accepted by Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara says in the introduction of the commentary over 
Taitirīya Upaniṣad - ‘What is eternal cannot have a beginning, and whatever has beginning is not eternal.’30 
Spinoza proves that God is the efficient cause of all things by the proposition-‘from the necessity of divine nature there 
must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes.
31
 Spinoza’s God is the immanent cause and not the transitive 
cause of all things.
32
 This matches with the illustration of spider and cob web cited by Śaṅkara in the sūtra devādivadapi 
loke (B.S.S. II.i.25) to prove that Brahman is the efficient as well as the material cause of the universe. Spider oozes the 
cob web from own body, louts creeper goes to different lake without any external vehicle similarly Brahman creates the 
world.
33
 Just as the water is the material cause of the bubbles. Bubbles rise, exist and dissolve in the water. Similarly 
Brahman is the material cause of the universe.
34
 Though not clearly stated, Spinoza’s view about the theory of causation 
is quite similar to that of Vivartavāda. 
4.   VISION OF UNITY 
Unity is established by Śaṅkara on the basis of Monism. He established the unity of Jīva and Brahman. Jagat is just the 
appearance of Brahman. Therefore, various things are nothing but the manifestations of Brahman due to ignorance. 
Ignorance is the root cause of the diversity seen in the universe. The whole world is filled with Ātman inside and out. It 
means all the contents of the universe are spiritual in their character.
35
  
Spinoza has established the Unity of God and universe by saying that whatever is in God, and nothing can be conceived 
without God.
36
 Except God, there is nothing which is conceived through itself. But modes cannot be conceived without 
substance. So they can be in the divine nature alone, and can be conceived through it alone. Therefore, everything is in 
God and nothing can be conceived without God. 
Unity is also established by the proposition –‘Each idea of each body, or of each singular thing which actually exists, 
necessarily involves an eternal and infinite essence of God.’37 Singular things cannot be conceived without God. This 
standpoint of unity also enters into Pantheistic monism. 
Pantheism is the belief that everything composes an all-encompassing, immanent God
38
, or that the universe (or nature) is 
identical with divinity.
39
 Pantheists do not believe in a personal or anthropomorphic god. Pantheistic monism identifies 
God with the universe and all that is in it i.e. all is one, one is all, all is God. Spinoza is described as a ‘God-intoxicated 
man,’ and used the word God to describe the unity of all substance.40 Spinoza has accepted the reality of one Substance. 
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He specifies that Substance only can be real and it is only one i.e. God.  God includes everything and therefore nothing 
exists without God. Difference existing in this world is admitted in the sphere of mode. Śaṅkara has given clear 
indications of the unity of Brahman and the world.
41
 
Both the philosophers had the vision of unity. Neither Śaṅkara’s Brahman nor Spinoza’s God is exclusive of everything 
but it is inclusive of everything.  
5.   PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD 
Spinoza has used geometrical method to reach towards the substance and ultimately to prove Absolute Monism. Spinoza 
assumes whole world as the geometrical theorem. He has given certain set of definitions, axioms, propositions which 
automatically takes us to the definite conclusions. E. M. Curley has pointed out that – ‘No philosopher should be easier to 
understand than Spinoza, for none has taken so much trouble to explain himself, defining his key terms, listing his basic 
assumptions, and arguing carefully for each conclusion her draws for these assumptions.’42 
Famous illustration used in Kevalādvaita Vedānta is that of ghaṭākāśa (space in the pot) and mahadākāśa (space which is 
not limited by any shackles). This illustration is cited by Gauḍapāda43 and adopted by Śaṅkara many times in his 
commentary over Brahmasūtras. There is no soul under bondage which is different from God. Still just like the 
association with such conditioning factors as pots, jars, caves of the mountains etc. it is assumed that God has association 
with such limiting adjuncts as body etc. Ignorance is the root cause of all such discriminations.
44
 
This illustration is purely geometrical in nature because geometry is the science of space. Triangle, circle etc shapes are 
formed with the division of space but ultimately space is one. Just as space is the sole reality in geometry though there are 
seen square, circle etc modifications of it. Infinite space can be reached by removing all the figures, lines and planes. This 
standpoint of Spinoza comes very closer to the vivartavāda of Śaṅkara.  
6.   APPEARANCE OR ILLUSION 
Śaṅkara has used the concept of māya to attain the coherence between unchanging Brahman and ever changing dynamic 
world. All changes seen in the world are justified on the basis of māya. Āvaraṇa (concealing) and vikṣepa (projecting) are 
two powers of māya by which truth is covered and different objects are seen instead of real thing. According to Śaṅkara, 
when this ignorance vanishes, knowledge of a sole reality dawns immediately. 
Spinoza has explained the concept of appearance on the basis of attributes and modes. Particular things are nothing but 
affections of the attributes of God, that is, modes wherein the attributes of God find expression in a definite and 
determinate way.
45
 A. Wolf opines while dealing with the relation of substance with the attributes- ‘attributes are not 
regarded as the real, objective characters of Substance, but only as our subjective ways of conceiving it’.46 
7.   PHILOSOPHICAL GOAL 
Śaṅkara’s philosophy is experiential and spiritual rather than mere theoretical discussion. As it is said by Eliot D. –
‘Advaita Vedānta is a religion as much as it is a technical philosophy; it is a way of spiritual realization as well as a 
system of thought.’47 Aim of Śaṅkara’s philosophy is mokṣa i.e. liberation which comes out of knowledge. Brahman 
cannot be known by any other pramāṇa.48  Brahmasakṣātkāra (realization of Ultimate Reality Brahman) or mokṣa is the 
real goal which is obtained when ignorance which is the root cause of saṁsāra is eradicated.49 In Ātmabodha, it is said 
that knowledge is the direct means of Liberation just as the fire is the direct cause of cooking.
50
 
Spinoza’s philosophy also has the concept of human bondage and freedom. His philosophy is the practical and spiritual in 
the sense that it has some practical and definite goal. Knowledge of God is the mind’s greatest good; its greatest virtue is 
to know God.
51
  By this proposition, Spinoza has given an ample scope for the knowledge of the Highest and it is 
regarded as the greatest virtue.  
The greatest striving of the mind and its greatest virtue is understanding things by the third kind of knowledge.
52
 The third 
kind of knowledge i.e. knowing the essence of a thing proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an 
adequate knowledge. If the essence of things and the more we understand things in this way, more we understand God. He 
who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the greatest human perfection, and consequently is affected with 
the greatest joy, accompanied by the idea of himself and his virtue. Therefore, greatest satisfaction which there can be 
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arises from this kind of knowledge.
53
 This third kind of knowledge depends on mind as the mind is eternal.
54
 Mind is 
eternal and capable of knowing all those things which can follow from the third kind of knowledge. It proves that Spinoza 
is opposed to the agnosticism like Śaṅkara. 
The more each of us is able to achieve this kind of knowledge, the more he is conscious of himself and of God, that is, 
more the perfect and blessed he is.
55
 Concept of salvation is also stated by Spinoza and given the concept of ultimate bliss 
which should be the goal of human being. He clearly states - ‘Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we 
take pleasure in, and our pleasure is accompanied by the idea of God as a cause.’ From this third kind of knowledge arises 
the greatest satisfaction of mind, this joy is accompanied by the idea of oneself and consequently it is also accompanied 
by the idea of God, as its cause.
56
 This is similar with the realization of self i.e. ātmānubhūti and God realization which is 
equivalent to mokṣa. For Śaṅkara, mokṣa is not something to be obtained, but it is to be realized.57  
Observations: 
1. Śaṅkara and Spinoza both maintain ‘Absolute monism’ in their philosophical standpoints. Both lean towards 
pantheistic attitude as they have identified everything with ultimate reality. This outlook of unity is favourable for 
attaining unity. 
2. Spinoza’s substance is similar to Śaṅkara’s Indeterminate Brahman. All the attributes belonging to this ultimate reality 
are regarded as the essence of the same. Śaṅkara has assumed indeterminate Brahman as the Highest Reality. 
Differences in the corporeal forms of God can be the reason of discord in spirituality. Idea of indeterminate reality has 
given a clear cut way to reconcile and subsume corporeal forms of Gods assumed by all the religions and philosophies.  
3. Śaṅkara has used the device of māya to prove the multiplicity of world. Spinoza has used the device of ‘modes’ to 
solve the problem of one and many. Differences existing in various religions can be dissolved on the basis of this 
concept i.e. they are the manifestations of the same reality. 
4. Both have adopted the logical method to prove their standpoints. For Śaṅkara, scriptural authority is of prime 
importance but he has given importance to tarka as well. Spinoza has proved everything on the basis of geometrical 
method. It means Universality is not just the matter of faith but can be proved on the basis of reason too. 
5. Both the philosophers have given importance to knowledge as the means of ultimate goal which is pure bliss. Proper 
knowledge of Self and its unity with the ultimate reality and understanding that all are one with Ultimately real 
principle is the goal of philosophy. 
To Sum up: 
Though both these philosophers are of different temperament and from different geographical areas, they meet at on one 
point of ‘Absolute Monism’ and their method in reaching this is strikingly similar. Absolute Monism of Śaṅkara and 
Spinoza rule out the appearing differences and by saying that ultimate reality is the essence of everything propound 
equality as well as Universal Spirituality. Comparative study of religion and philosophy should be the part of education in 
order to create all inclusive universal spirituality. It not only gives us an idea about the existing similarities but also a new 
outlook that all religions and philosophies ponder upon the same ultimate reality only their languages, methods and 
standpoints different.  
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41 B. S. S. II.i.20 
अिश्च कृत्नतय जगिो रह्मकायवत्वात्तदिवयत्वाि ।  
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42 S. P. Kasyap, xiii 
43 Gauḍapādakārikā II.4 
र्टाददषु प्रलीिेषु र्टाकाशादयो यर्ा । 
आकाशे संप्रलीयविे िद्वज्जीवेहात्मिि ॥ 
44 B.S.S. I.i.5 
 िेश्वरादवय: संसारी । िर्ािप देहाददसंर्ािोपािर्संबवर् इष्यि एव, र्टकरकिगररगुहाद्युपािर्संबवर् इव व्योम्न: । 
45  Ethics I, Prop. 25, Corollary 
46 A. Wolf, 17 
47 E. Deutsch, 4 
48 B.S.S. I.i.1 
ज्ञािेि िह प्रमाणेिवगविुिमष्टं रह्म।  
49 B.S.S. I.i.2 
 रह्मावगििर्हह पुरुषार्व: िि:शेषसंसारबीजािवद्यािर्वििबहवणाि् । ितमाद्ब्रह्म िजज्ञािसिव्यम् । 
50 Ātmabodha 2 
बोर्ोऽवयसार्िेभ्यो िह साक्षावमोक्षैकसार्िम् । पाकतय विनिवि् ज्ञािं िविा मोक्षो िह िसध्यिि । 
51 Ethics IV. Prop. 28 
52 Ethics IV. Prop. 25 
53 Ibid  IV. Prop. 27 
54 Ibid  IV. Prop. 31 
55 Ibid  IV. Prop. 31. Schol. 
56 Ibid  IV. Prop.32, dem. 
57 B.S.S. I.i.4 
ि िह दध्यादद िवकायं, उत्पाद्यं वा र्टादद, िित्यं दषृ्ट ंलोके, िािप संतकायो मोक्ष: । 
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